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IVF BATTLES: LEGAL CATEGORIES AND 
COMPARATIVE TALES 
DAPHNE BARAK-EREZ∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Coupled with modern reproductive technologies, the ancient desire for 
parenthood has led to novel legal challenges. This essay discusses landmark 
cases addressing those challenges. At the outset, it distinguishes between two 
litigation paradigms in this area—termed “horizontal” and “vertical.” 
Horizontal controversies involve private parties who have different 
aspirations regarding a joint parenthood project (e.g., between two partners 
who began an IVF procedure and later disagree whether to complete the 
process). In contrast, vertical controversies concern clashes between an 
individual (or individuals) and the state, such as when the state or one of its 
authorities does not allow the individual to move forward with technologies 
that may lead to parenthood (e.g., new surrogacy procedures), though all 
affected individuals consent. The essay then focuses on horizontal litigation, 
and examines the ways in which various legal systems draw on, and 
sometimes adjust to the particular circumstances of the case, traditional 
concepts such as contract, reliance, property, and more to resolve such 
disputes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aspiration for parenthood (and sometimes even beyond—for 
grandparenthood) is often assumed to be—at least by the majority of 
views—an inherent trait of humankind. It is prevalent in human societies in 
ways that transcend conditions and cultures. At the same time, some aspects 
of this aspiration are culturally dependent. This essay is dedicated to 
evaluating one particularly sensitive variant: the intersection of sophisticated 
technological possibilities with the aspirations of prospective parents, when 
their aspirations conflict with one another. 
This essay examines the ways in which various legal systems draw on, 
and sometimes adjust, traditional concepts of contract, reliance, property, 
and more to resolve such disputes. For example, is an understanding between 
prospective parents a contract? Does it relate to property or to an interest that 
has some property characteristics? Is it governed by private or public law? 
What is the role of the pre-formulated consent forms that IVF clinics may 
require? This essay explores how the preliminary choice of analogy shapes 
courts’ analyses in IVF-related disputes. 
I. THE BACKGROUND CONDITIONS FOR COMPARISON:  
LAW AND CULTURE 
The overarching question regarding reproductive technologies is 
whether what is feasible from a scientific and technological perspective 
should also be permissible from a legal perspective.1 Indeed, the law is not 
expected to mirror the scope of scientific possibilities. At the same time, it 
 
 1.  I expressed this notion in my opinion in the case of HCJ 4077/12 Doe v. Ministry of Health 
(5.2.2013) (hereinafter: Sperm Bank case), to be discussed later. I stated the following: “The case at bar 
is yet another example of the new challenges presented by scientific and technological progress. From a 
medical aspect, a woman who seeks conception may select the preferred sperm donor after having 
reviewed his specifications as well as the availability of a sperm unit ‘inventory’ provided by him. The 
availability of such possibilities to her join many other situations in which technology creates new 
opportunities—freezing ova or storing sperm (for future use thereof), early detection of embryo genetic 
diseases, and more. These situations repeatedly raise the question of whether the availability of a certain 
mode of action, as a matter of science and technology, necessarily entails the existence of a right to use 
it, and that the exercise of such right is not to be limited.” Id. at para. 32 of my opinion. 
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would be naïve to think that new scientific and technological possibilities do 
not influence and reshape the scope of legality. 
When examining legal questions relating to reproductive technologies, 
comparative law seems to be especially useful. The rise of these technologies 
occurred in different places around the same time and several legal systems 
simultaneously looked for solutions to similar disputes. Because the moral 
and human dilemmas are similar across jurisdictions, the comparison comes 
naturally. This is, in fact, reflected in some of the judicial decisions discussed 
below, which explicitly take insights from comparative law. 
In addition, some of these cases include a transnational dimension, as 
couples from jurisdictions with restrictive rules on IVF often opt to begin the 
procedure in countries with more permissive regulatory frameworks. Thus, 
very practically, the “fertility tourism” phenomenon directly results from a 
comparative analysis of different legal systems. At the same time, legal 
decision-making in this area—and the moral intuitions that guide it—is 
deeply influenced by background cultural conditions. Therefore, a 
comparative law analysis relating to reproductive technologies must be 
conducted with care.2 
For example, the legal regime applying to the use of reproductive 
technologies in Israel might reflect the fact that the local culture is very 
family-oriented, as a result of both Jewish tradition generally and the national 
trauma of the Holocaust. Israel is, in fact, a leader in fertility medicine. Not 
only does Israel have highly advanced medical treatments, but, more 
importantly, the state supports assisted fertilization in a benevolent manner, 
giving it priority above many other medical services. Fertilization treatments 
are included in Israel’s national health insurance law;3 every woman is 
entitled to fertilization treatments. Universal access to fertility medicine 
highlights a sociological reality; in Israel, having children is not merely a 
“right,” “privilege,” or “choice,” but rather is regarded almost as a social 
duty.4 In a different way, Germany’s approach to reproductive technology 
 
 2.  For the use of comparative law to inspire legislation in areas that involve technological 
innovations and moral dilemmas, see Daphne Barak-Erez, The Institutional Aspects of Comparative Law, 
15 COLUM. J. EUROPEAN L. 477, 482–83 (2009). 
 3.  National Health Insurance Law – 1994, [1994] Sefer Hahukim (No. 1469) 156. 
 4.  See also SUSAN MARTHA KAHN, REPRODUCING JEWS: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT OF ASSISTED 
CONCEPTION 3–4 (2000); Carmel Shalev and Sigal Gooldin, The Uses and Misuses of In-Vitro 
Fertilization in Israel: Some Sociological and Ethical Considerations, 12 NASHIM: A JOURNAL OF 
JEWISH WOMEN’S STUDIES & GENDER ISSUES, 151, 152 (2006); Daphne Barak-Erez, Reproductive 
Rights in a Jewish and Democratic State, CONSTITUTIONAL SECULARISM IN AN AGE OF RELIGIOUS 
REVIVAL 228, 230 (Susanna Mancini and Michel Rosenfeld eds., 2014). 
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has been shaped by, and in opposition to, the country’s Nazi history.5 In 
China, the use of IVF was sometimes regarded as a way to apply the “one 
child policy.”6 Other commentators have argued that in the U.S., the 
development of reproductive technology law has been influenced by the 
background culture, which values freedom of contract—and thus the use of 
reproductive technologies has been subject, mainly, to contract law.7 
II. TWO TYPES OF LEGAL CLASHES: HORIZONTAL AND 
VERTICAL 
It is important first to distinguish between two reproduction-related 
litigation paradigms: horizontal and vertical. Horizontal controversies are 
litigated between (at least) two private parties who have different aspirations 
regarding a joint parenthood project—for example, two partners who started 
an IVF procedure but later disagree whether to complete it. In contrast, 
vertical controversies involve conflicts between individuals and the state, 
usually when the state or one of its agencies tries to prevent individuals from 
using technological possibilities that may allow them to reach aspired 
parenthood—e.g., surrogacy procedures (which, while previously not at all 
possible, are now regulated and therefore subject to certain conditions).8 
 
 5.  The applicable statute is the Embryo Protection Act 1990 of December 13, 1990 (BGBl. I p. 
2746), last amended by Article 1 of the Law of November 21, 2011 (BGBl. I p. 2228). This law is mainly 
directed at medical professionals and prohibits actions conducted without consent. Section 4(1) of this 
law states that a person shall be punished with up to three years imprisonment or a fine if he or she 
“undertakes artificially to fertilize an egg cell without the woman whose egg cell is to be fertilized, and 
the man whose sperm cell will be used for fertilization, having given consent”. See SHEILA JASANOFF, 
DESIGNS ON NATURE: SCIENCE AND DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 159 (2005); YAEL 
HASHILONI-DOLEV, A LIFE (UN)WORTHY OF LIVING: REPRODUCTIVE GENETICS IN ISRAEL AND 
GERMANY 29–30 (2007). 
 6.  In certain Chinese provinces, some doctors justified the use of IVF as a fair application of the 
one child policy, i.e., it would allow everyone to have one child. See Ayo Wahlberg, The Birth and 
Routinization of IVF in China, 2 REPRODUCTIVE BIOMEDICINE & SOC. 97, 104 (2016) (“So I told the 
Family Planning bureau in Hunan that our population policy should be based on this idea that every family 
should have one healthy baby, not only fertile, but also infertile couples, so this is fair to every family.”). 
 7.  See John A. Robertson, Reproductive Technology in Germany and the United States: An Essay 
in Comparative Law and Bioethics, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSN’L L. 189, 193–94 (2004). For the many uses 
of contracts in the context of U.S. family law, see generally Adrienne Jules and Fernanda Nicola, The 
Contractualization of Family Law in the United States, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 151 (2014). 
 8.  In Israel, for example, surrogacy is legal only for heterosexual couples, according to a statute 
enacted in 1996. The first petition to the Supreme Court protesting this limitation was brought by a single 
woman. At the time, the petition was dismissed based on a reasoning that acknowledged the legitimacy 
of limiting the scope of new experimental legislative models. See HCJ 2458/01 New Family v. Committee 
for Approval of Surrogacy Contracts, Ministry of Health, 57(1) PD 419 (2002) (Isr.). Almost twenty years 
later, another petition was brought against the law, this time by same-sex couples. So far, the Supreme 
Court has refrained from deciding the case, since a new bill concerning proposed reforms to the current 
statute is being considered in the Knesset. The Court expressed grave concerns regarding the 
constitutionality of the statute’s limitations that prevent its application to same-sex couples and singles, 
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Sometimes, the two types of litigation become interrelated, such as when the 
state does not permit surrogacy and only one of the partners would like to 
pursue it abroad. 
Notably, this distinction is also present in the area of abortion law, 
where two prospective parents might have different views regarding the 
continuation of a pregnancy, and in addition their choices might be legally 
limited. However, in the area of abortion law, most legal debates have 
focused on the vertical clash, since once the pregnancy starts, the mother has, 
in the horizontal arena, an inherent advantage: the fate of the pregnancy has 
physical implications only for her.9 
This essay focuses on horizontal, rather than vertical, conflicts in the 
area of IVF. There are several reasons for this. First, horizontal litigation 
between private parties in this area predates vertical litigation vis-à-vis state 
regulation, and therefore it is already possible to reflect on its developments. 
Second, horizontal clashes provide a better opportunity to assess the legal 
regulation of parenthood—without the need to consider its impact on third 
parties or the public at large (necessarily part and parcel of vertical analyses, 
which in turn include issues like the availability of surrogacy). 
However, even horizontal case analysis requires considering the 
background regulation of the vertical sphere. For example, parties who want 
to use IVF procedures that will be completed through surrogacy depend on 
the surrogacy procedure’s legality. A sweeping prohibition on surrogacy in 
the parties’ country of residence may sometimes even influence the legality 
of their consent to go through it elsewhere. It is worthwhile noting that, while 
the scope of legal surrogacy and its availability is hotly debated, the use of 
IVF procedures as such is now widely permitted.10 
 
but refrained from deciding the issue in order to allow the Knesset to complete the legislative process. 
See HCJ 781/15 Arad-Pinkas v. The Committee for Approval of Surrogacy Contracts authorized by the 
Surrogacy Contracts (Approval of Contract and the Status of the Newborn), 1996 (3.8.2017) (Isr.). 
 9.  In other words, in contrast to abortion law, horizontal IVF-related conflicts are not dominated 
by the winning argument regarding the impact of the decision on the woman’s body.   
 10.  Generally speaking, the legality of IVF procedures is largely accepted. An exception to this was 
presented in Costa Rica, where the Supreme Court decided in 2000 that IVF procedures jeopardize the 
life and dignity of human beings. See Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Costa Rica, 
Sentencia No. 2306-00 de las 15:21 horas del 15 de marzo del 2002 (website of Sistema Costarricense de 
Información Jurídica). In Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica (2012), the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights criticized this view, deciding a case in favor of infertile couples who, due to the ban, had not been 
able to undergo IVF treatment. In the judgment, the Inter-American Court stated that the approach of the 
Costa Rican Supreme Court arbitrarily interfered with the rights to privacy and family life. It was 
established that the ban constituted a form of discrimination against infertile people in Costa Rica, as it 
impeded their access to a treatment that would have remedied their disadvantage in relation to fertile 
couples—namely the possibility of having biological children. Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica, Preliminary 
objections, merits, reparations, and costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) ¶ 381 (Nov. 28, 2012). 
See also S. H. v. Austria, concerning the Austrian law on IVF. This law limited recourse to IVF 
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III. COURTS SEARCHING FOR A MODEL: BORROWING FROM 
VARIOUS LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
The most common form of horizontal litigation stems from former 
partners who commenced an IVF procedure together but later come to differ 
over the future of the procedure—more concretely, over the future of frozen 
embryos.11 The typical question before the courts is, therefore, whether the 
partner who wishes to proceed with the IVF procedure may do so without 
the other party’s consent.12 
Examining the accumulated judicial experience of several systems 
reveals that despite background differences, courts have based their 
decisions in these matters on well-established legal frames of reference, such 
as contract and property. Since there are several possible ways to analogize 
new reproductive questions to existing legal institutions, the preliminary 
choice of model tends to dictate the result. Despite its importance, quite 
often, this preliminary choice is made by courts without legislative guidance. 
This analysis will thus start by presenting the models used by courts from 
 
procedures to the use of the sperm and ova of a couple who wanted a child, with limited exceptions. 
Originally, the Austrian court ruled, in 1999, that the law passed relevant tests. However, the European 
Court of Human Rights held that the government’s argument, that a complete prohibition on donations 
was the only way to prevent the risks associated with donor gametes, was not convincing. The original 
decision was handed down in 2010 (Application 57813/00) (1 April 2010), and the decision of the Grand 
Chamber was in 2011 (3 November 2011). X S.H. v. Austria, Eur. C. H.R. (2011). 
 11.  Where the IVF procedure has not developed to the stage of fertilizing embryos, the connection 
between the two partners is easily replaceable, and therefore these issues do not arise in any significant 
manner. 
 12.  The less customary format of litigation, which lies beyond the scope of this analysis, concerns 
cases in which one of the partners manages to complete the process without the consent of the other, by 
way of misrepresentation or even deceit. See, e.g., ARB v. IVF Hammersmith Ltd. (2017) EWHC 2438 
(QB) (dismissing a wrongful birth case against an IVF clinic. In this case, a heterosexual couple had 
engaged in IVF proceedings at the renowned IVF clinic of Hammersmith in 2008, which after just one 
cycle led to the birth of a son. A number of embryos remained frozen and the couple maintained contact 
with the clinic for advice. Two years later, the woman forged her partner’s signature on a consent form 
and, on the basis of this, had an embryo implanted into her womb. Ultimately, she gave birth to a daughter. 
In the meantime, the relationship had broken. While the girl lived with the mother for most of the time, 
the father also fulfilled parental duties. His action for compensation from the IVF clinic, including the 
cost of private education and refurbishing a bedroom, was dismissed, on the basis that no compensation 
could be due for the birth of a healthy baby.); Högsta Domstolens, Judgement of October 29, 2015, T 
4994-14, Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv 2015, at 675 (Swe) (dismissing a request to deny paternity. In this case, a 
married couple, KB and ÅB, undertook an IVF procedure with donated sperm that, following the transfer 
of two embryos, allowed ÅB to give birth to twins. The couple divorced soon thereafter. KB petitioned 
the court to annul his legal status of paternity, formed pursuant to his marriage with ÅB, on the finding 
that his consent to IVF had been limited to the transfer of a single embryo. The court held that, although 
ÅB had concealed the limited scope of her husband’s consent during the treatment, his interest not to be 
the father of twins could under no circumstances outweigh the interest of the children to have a legal 
father.). 
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different jurisdictions. Later, it will point to some relevant legislative 
initiatives. 
A. Contract? 
Most courts have analyzed IVF-related controversies using a contract 
law framework. Their decisions can be described as presenting a contract-
based model (what will be termed in this essay the “contractual model”)—
that is, they resolve the conflict based on the parties’ expressed or implied 
agreement.  Since the advent of these disputes, the contractual model has 
been perceived as the “natural” choice in the absence of any applicable 
statutory provision, given that the parties had to agree with one another to 
start IVF treatment in the first instance. In addition, fertility clinics usually 
require prospective parents to sign agreements and consent forms at the 
initiation of the IVF process—at least vis-à-vis the clinic. These documents 
sometimes include provisions that influence the rights and duties of the 
partners vis-à-vis one another. 
The contractual model assumes that what governs the fate of frozen 
embryos is the partners’ consent, subject to the limitations imposed by 
contract law on the enforcement of certain contracts, especially contracts 
with intense personal aspects. In practice, as explained below, the 
implementation of the contractual model usually benefits the party who 
wishes to stop the IVF process.13 
B. Reliance? 
In some relatively exceptional cases, courts have been willing to go 
beyond the formal contours of private law to embrace a balancing model, 
which takes into account the real consequences of the decision for the parties. 
Termed here the “reliance model,” this approach has enabled courts to 
consider the grave reliance of parties for whom stopping a pending IVF 
procedure has irreversible consequences, as it is their sole chance to achieve 
biological parenthood—for example, when one of the partners becomes 
sterile. 
C. Property? 
Presumably, property law could provide an alternative legal framework 
for deciding these cases (here, the “property model”). However, property 
law, standing alone, has often been considered a less appropriate alternative 
because the background issue remains linked to the parties’ agreement 
 
 13.  See infra Part IV. 
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regarding this “property,” and whether that agreement is enforceable.14 In 
addition, reference to property law implies the commodification of human 
materials such as sperm and eggs, which is itself controversial. As a 
consequence, courts frequently refer to frozen embryos as having property 
traits, rather than directly calling them property—or, as the Tennessee 
Supreme Court stated in Davis v. Davis, “property deserving special 
respect.”15 
D. Personhood? 
In general, and in contrast to abortion-related cases, efforts to decide 
controversies between ex-partners by using a trump card—the argument that 
frozen embryos are a form of life and therefore the party interested in using 
them for fertilization should prevail (the “personhood model”)—seem to 
remain in the periphery. In fact, even those who promote the view that life 
begins with conception tend to be reluctant about making that argument with 
regard to frozen embryos.16 
The argument for the personhood model was presented most strongly 
in the Irish case Roche v. Roche.17 In Roche, a woman sued her estranged 
husband for the right to use three frozen embryos. She based her argument 
on the Irish Constitution, which expressly states that “[t]he State 
acknowledges the right to life of the unborn.”18 The Supreme Court of 
Ireland held that when this provision was debated, there had been no 
consensus regarding the question when human life begins and therefore it 
 
 14.  The Canadian case, C.C. v. A.W., 2005 ABQB 290, presents an exceptional example of a 
court’s reference to property law with no qualifications. This case concerned the matter of Ms. CC and 
Mr. AW, who were former lovers, and who later remained friends. In 1998, AW donated sperm so that 
CC could become pregnant through IVF. On the third attempt, CC became pregnant with twins, who were 
born in 2001. Four fertilized embryos remained in the clinic. CC wanted to use the remaining embryos 
but AW refused to consent to their release, citing his difficulty co-parenting the twins with CC as his 
reason. The court found that AW gave his sperm to CC as a friend and as an unqualified gift in order to 
conceive children. AW knew that CC could use the embryos when and as she chose. Thus, the court held 
that the remaining embryos were CC’s property, to be used as she saw fit, and that AW had no legal 
interest in them. 
 15.  Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992). This was in contrast to the Court of 
Appeals’ holding, which effectively treated the frozen embryos as mere “property.” Id. at 595–97. See 
generally Bridget M. Fuselier, The Trouble with Putting All of your Eggs in One Basket: Using a Property 
Rights Model to Resolve Disputes Over Cryopreserved Pre-Embryos, 14 TEX. J. CIV. LIB. & CIV. RTS. 
143 (2009). 
 16.  This was actually the view of the trial court in Davis v. Davis. See Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 
1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *30 (Tenn. Cir. Ct.1989) (hereinafter Davis Trial Court) (“The Court 
finds and concludes that by whatever name one chooses to call the seven frozen entities—be it preembryo 
or embryo—those entities are human beings; they are not property.”).  
 17.  Roche v. Roche, (2010) 2 I.R. 321. 
 18.  Constitution of Ireland 1937, art. 40.3.3. 
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should not be interpreted as covering frozen embryos outside the mother’s 
womb. Accordingly, the Court limited itself to adding that the embryos 
should be “treated with respect.”19 
In the U.S., the Missouri Court of Appeals, in McQueen v. Gadberry,20  
dismissed a similar pro-life argument. The majority opinion held that the 
frozen embryos in question should not be protected as “human beings.”21 
Interestingly, in that case, the majority did accept the view that the embryos 
were property.22 However, its main analysis was based on contract law.23 In 
contrast, in Louisiana, state legislation specifically defines frozen embryos 
as “persons.”24 
E. Legislation? 
Because the answers to these questions are so complicated, a legislative 
scheme would be very helpful. However, in many countries the legislature is 
silent. At any rate, when legislation does exist, its evaluation often raises 
many of the same questions, this time on the constitutional level, due to its 
potential to bear on such rights.25 
IV. THE CONTRACTUAL MODEL AND PRIORITIZING THE 
NEGATIVE RIGHT 
Irrespective of the actual contents of the contract in question, the 
application of the contractual model to IVF disputes has typically led courts 
to prioritize the party resisting completion of the procedure. On the one hand, 
with regard to contracts that include a commitment to continue the process, 
courts have largely ruled the commitment unenforceable, thereby aligning 
 
 19.  Roche, (2010) 2 I.R. 321 at par. 219 (Geoghegan, J.). 
 20.  McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 127 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g and transfer denied 
(Dec. 15, 2016), transfer denied 2017 Mo. LEXIST 32 (Mo. Jan. 31, 2017). The case was decided by a 
majority of two judges, with one judge dissenting. 
 21.  Id. at 147–48 (“We also hold that an application of section 1.205, including declarations that 
life begins at conception/fertilization, to the frozen pre-embryos and to Missouri’s dissolution statutes 
under the circumstances of this case, (1) would be contrary to U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting 
the U.S. Constitution; and (2) would violate Gadberry’s constitutional right to privacy, right to be free 
from governmental interference, and right not to procreate. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in 
failing to classify the frozen pre-embryos as children under Chapter 452.”). In fact, the judges in the 
majority accepted the view that the “frozen embryos [were] marital property of a special character.” Id. 
at 149. However, the main analysis in the case was contractual.  
 22.  Id. at 148–49.  
 23.  Id. at 155–58.  
 24.  La. Stat. Ann. § 9:123 (2017) (“An in vitro fertilized human ovum exists as a juridical person 
until such time as the in vitro fertilized ovum is implanted in the womb; or at any other time when rights 
attach to an unborn child in accordance with law.”). 
 25.  See infra Part VI. 
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with the traditional tendency in contract law to avoid enforcing contracts for 
personal services. On the other hand, with regard to contracts that condition 
the procedure on continued mutual consent, the party resisting the process 
can easily base his or her arguments on the contract’s contents. In such cases, 
courts have generally relied on a “freedom of contract” precept to rule on 
that party’s behalf. In other words, the argument that the contractual model 
should lead to the enforcement of a clear commitment to continue the process 
has not had much success.26 
The contractual model is best exemplified by American case law.27 This 
is the legacy of the first, and perhaps most famous, case litigated in the U.S., 
Davis v. Davis28—although the case itself did not involve a contract, as 
explained below. In that case, the plaintiff, who suffered from a medical 
condition that rendered her unable to conceive, and her husband started IVF 
treatments, which produced seven frozen pre-embryos.29 Subsequently, the 
plaintiff’s husband filed for divorce.30 Despite the split, the plaintiff wanted 
to use the seven frozen embryos for future attempts to become pregnant.31 
Her ex-husband, the defendant, was opposed.32 Notably, by the time suit was 
filed, the preferences of the two parties had shifted: both parties had 
remarried, and rather than use the frozen embryos herself, the plaintiff sought 
 
 26.  For a contractual approach that supports a different result when the contract includes a clear 
pre-commitment to the process’ continuation, see generally John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for 
Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 407 (1990); John A. Robertson, Precommitment 
Strategies for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 50 EMORY L. J. 989 (2001); John A. Robertson, 
Precommitment Issues in Bioethics, 81 TEXAS L. REV. 1849 (2003). For a contractual approach that insists 
on continued mutual consent, see also Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous 
Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 55 (1999).  
 27.  Interestingly, a German court decision also insisted on mutual consent until the moment of 
transfer to the womb. In Germany, surrogacy is illegal. See Robertson, supra note 7. Therefore, this 
question may arise only when fertilized eggs are intended for implementation into the womb of the 
biological mother. Another reason for the scarcity of cases from Germany is the limitation on how many 
eggs may be fertilized in each round of the procedure (to three, according to section 1(3) of the law). See 
Landgericht Bonn, Judgement of October 19, 2016 - 1 O 42/16, ECLI:DE:LGBN:2016:1019.1O42.16.0A 
(upholding the notion of required continued consent. In this case, the prospective parents had signed a 
notarized agreement granting both parties the right to withdraw from the IVF procedure “until its 
completion.”). After the eggs had been fertilized, but before their implantation, one party signaled his 
withdrawal. Id. The court held that both parties enjoyed the right to become—or not become—a parent, 
irrespective of the choice of a certain reproductive technology. If IVF allows parties to postpone the 
decision to procreate to the later stage (the actual transfer of the fertilized embryo), then there has to be 
continued consent until this very moment. Id. The court added that the Embryo Protection Act did not 
intend to modify this principle). Id. 
 28.  Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598 (1992). 
 29.  Id. at 591. 
 30.  Id. at 592. 
 31.  Id. at 589. 
 32.  Id.  
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to donate them to a childless couple.33 The trial court sided with the plaintiff 
and awarded her custody of the embryos based on the personhood model 
(referring to the frozen embryos as human beings).34 The Court of Appeals 
reversed, employing the property model to hold that both parties would need 
to agree to continue the process.35 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed and, after duly 
considering the possibility of regulating the relationship of the parties under 
contract law, held that, “as a starting point . . . an agreement regarding 
disposition of any untransferred preembryos in the event of contingencies 
(such as the death of one or more of the parties, divorce, financial reversals, 
or abandonment of the program) should be presumed valid”36 and can be 
enforced between prospective parents. At the same time, the Court 
recognized the possibility that “the initial agreements may later be modified 
by agreement will,”37 and that this protected the parties “against some of the 
risks they face in this regard.”38 The Court did not have the opportunity to 
fully evaluate the contractual model as a basis for resolving the dispute 
because it found that the parties did not make an actual or implied contract, 
aside from agreeing that the wife could use the frozen embryos to become 
pregnant.39 Absent a contract, the Court decided to balance the interests of 
the parties and held for the husband, ruling that his negative interest in 
avoiding parenthood was greater than his ex-wife’s interest in avoiding the 
emotional burden of knowing that the embryos would go unused.40 
 
 33.  Id. at 590. 
 34.  Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *36 (Tenn. Cir. Ct.1989) (“In 
the case at bar, the undisputed, uncontroverted testimony is that to allow the parties seven cryogentically 
preserved human embryos to remain so preserved for a period exceeding two years is tantamount to the 
destruction of these human beings. It was the clear intent of Mr. and Mrs. Davis to create a child or 
children to be known as their family. No one disputes the fact that unless the human embryos, in vitro, 
are implanted, their lives will be lost; they will die a passive death.”). See supra Part III (D) (explaining 
the “personhood model”). 
 35.  Davis v. Davis, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 1990). The Court of 
Appeals referred to an earlier decision that concerned a dispute between a couple and an IVF clinic. See 
York v. Jones, 717 F.Supp. 421, 423-24 (E.D.Va. 1989). See also supra Part III(C) (explaining the 
“property model”). 
 36. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992). 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 598. 
 40.  Id. at 604 (“Refusal to permit donation of the preembryos would impose on her the burden of 
knowing that the lengthy IVF procedures [the plaintiff] underwent were futile, and that the preembryos 
to which she contributed genetic material would never become children. While this is not an insubstantial 
emotional burden, we can only conclude that Mary Sue Davis’s interest in donation is not as significant 
as the interest Junior Davis has in avoiding parenthood.”). 
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Davis proved to be hugely influential. Other American courts have 
largely followed, analyzing similar cases through the contractual model. 
Consequently, most often, they rule to protect the negative right to avoid 
parenthood. 
The second important case to follow Davis was Kass v. Kass.41 Mr. and 
Ms. Kass were married in 1988 and soon thereafter began IVF treatment.42 
During the enrollment process, the couple signed an agreement that stated, 
among other things, that if they were unable to decide what to do with any 
of the frozen embryos, they would be given to the IVF program for 
research.43 In 1993, with divorce imminent, the couple signed an uncontested 
divorce agreement that included a passage stating that the frozen embryos 
would be disposed of in the manner outlined in the consent form.44 A month 
later, Ms. Kass requested sole custody of the frozen embryos with the 
intention of undergoing another implantation procedure.45 Mr. Kass opposed 
the request and any further attempts by Ms. Kass to achieve pregnancy with 
the couple’s embryos.46 The trial court granted Ms. Kass custody of the 
frozen embryos, but the appellate court reversed.47 While divided on whether 
the contract was too ambiguous to enforce, the court unanimously held that 
when parties to an IVF procedure contract regarding the means to dispose of 
any unused fertilized eggs, their agreement should control.48 Accordingly, 
the court held that the signed agreement clearly expressed the parties’ intent 
and, thus, the frozen embryos should be donated to the IVF program for 
research purposes.49 
In AZ. v. BZ,50 the Massachusetts Supreme Court held unenforceable an 
IVF-related contract stipulating that an IVF process could continue in the 
event of marital separation, thus reinforcing the negative right to avoid 
unwanted parenthood articulated in Davis v. Davis.51 In AZ. v. BZ, the 
partners participated in a prolonged IVF treatment, which produced several 
frozen embryos.52 The clinic had presented the parties with a contract form 
that asked, among other things, what it should do with any frozen embryos 
 
 41.  Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E. 2d 174, 174 (N.Y. 1998). 
 42.  Id. at 175. 
 43.  Id. at 176–77. 
 44.  Id. at 177.  
 45.  Id.  
 46.  Id.  
 47.  Id.. 
 48.  Id. at 180.  
 49.  Id. at 182.  
 50.  A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000). 
 51.  See Kass, 696 N.E. at 182. 
 52.  A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1053.  
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in the event of marital separation. The husband signed a blank form and the 
wife wrote in that the embryos should be “returned to the wife for 
implantation.”53 The couple succeeded in having twin daughters.54 They later 
divorced, but before their separation the wife stated her intent to become 
pregnant again using the remaining frozen pre-embryos, and her ex-husband 
objected.55 The Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that the prior written 
agreement between the husband and wife regarding the status of the frozen 
embryos in the event of a divorce was unenforceable.56 The court further held 
that IVF contracts may not give one party the right to continue with the 
process without the other party’s consent.57 Under the guise of contract law, 
the court thus embraced a strong value preference for the protection of a 
negative freedom: to be free from unwanted parenthood. Although it did not 
constitute part of the court’s reasoning in this case, it is also important to 
note that the couple already had children.58 This has proven to be relevant in 
similar cases, as discussed below.59 
The same reasoning was applied in J.B. v. M.B.60 There, a married 
couple started IVF procedures and managed to have a child.61 Soon after, 
they filed for divorce.62 The wife wanted to destroy the frozen embryos, but 
the husband wanted to donate them to other infertile couples.63 The only 
written agreement between the couple was a consent form from the IVF 
clinic, which stated that in the event of a divorce, the couple would relinquish 
control of the frozen embryos to the clinic or as otherwise determined by a 
court in the divorce proceedings.64 
Once again, the court upheld a negative right and ruled in favor of the 
party seeking to destroy the embryos.65 The Supreme Court of New Jersey 
first held that the husband and wife had never entered into a separate binding 
 
 53.  Id. at 1053–54. 
 54.  Id. at 1053. 
 55.  Id.  
 56.  Id. at 1057.  
 57.  Id. (“With this said, we conclude that, even had the husband and the wife entered into an 
unambiguous agreement between themselves regarding the disposition of the frozen preembryos, we 
would not enforce an agreement that would compel one donor to become a parent against his or her 
will.”). 
 58.  A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1052 (Mass. 2000). 
 59.  See infra Part V. 
 60.  783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001). 
 61.  Id. at 710. 
 62.  Id. at 708.  
 63.  Id. at 710. Interestingly, this time it was the wife who wanted to dispose of the embryos, in 
contrast to most other examples. 
 64.  Id. at 709–710.  
 65.  Id. at 720.  
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contract providing for the status of their embryos in unambiguous and 
unconditional terms.66 More importantly, it held that an agreement regarding 
the implantation of frozen embryos resulting from an IVF procedure is 
generally unenforceable if one of the parties changes his or her mind before 
implantation.67 Here, too, however, it is important to note that the parties 
already had a child. Though not relevant to a contract-model analysis, that 
fact may have provided important background to the case, a factor that will 
be—as already indicated—assessed later.68 
Iowa applied very similar reasoning in the case In re Marriage of 
Witten.69 There, too, a divorced couple disagreed regarding the fate of 
embryos they had produced through IVF while still married.70 As part of the 
IVF process, they had signed a consent form prepared by the medical center 
that detailed the transfer, release, or disposition of the embryonic eggs upon 
certain contingencies, but was silent regarding what should happen in the 
case of the couple’s divorce.71 After the divorce, the wife, the appellant, 
sought to use the frozen embryos to have children against her ex-husband’s 
wishes. He, in turn, did not want the frozen embryos destroyed or for his ex-
wife to use them, but was not opposed to donating them to another couple.72 
The case eventually came before the Supreme Court of Iowa.73 The Court 
found that the contract did extend to the circumstances, but held that “judicial 
enforcement of an agreement between a couple regarding their future family 
and reproductive choices would be against the public policy of this state.”74 
Eventually, since the couple could not agree regarding the outcome, the eggs 
remained frozen.75 In essence, this solution de-facto prioritized, once again, 
the party resisting the process’ completion. 
 
 66.  J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 714 (N.J. 2001). 
 67.  Id. at 719–20 (“We believe that the better rule, and the one we adopt, is to enforce agreements 
entered into at the time in vitro fertilization is begun, subject to the right of either party to change his or 
her mind about disposition up to the point of use or destruction of any stored pre-embryos . . . . Finally, 
if there is disagreement as to disposition because one party has reconsidered his or her earlier decision, 
the interests of both parties must be evaluated . . . . Because ordinarily the party choosing not to become 
a biological parent will prevail, we do not anticipate increased litigation as a result of our decision.”). 
 68.  See infra Part V. 
 69.  672 N.W.2d 768, 780-81 (Iowa 2003). 
 70.   Id. at 772–773.  
 71.  Id. at 772. 
 72.  Id. at 773 (“Trip testified at the trial that while he did not want the embryos destroyed, he did 
not want Tamera to use them. He would not oppose donating the embryos for use by another couple.”).  
 73.  Id. at 772.  
 74.  Id. at 782.  
 75.  In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 783 (Iowa 2003). 
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More recently, the Missouri Court of Appeals decided McQueen v. 
Gadberry.76 McQueen and Gadberry married in 2005, separated in 2010, and 
filed for divorce in 2013.77 During their marriage, they used IVF to create 
four pre-embryos, two of which were used to produce twins.78 Notably, the 
couple’s decision to use IVF was not related to any issues with fertility, but 
rather was because the couple was geographically separated by Gadberry’s 
military service.79 After the couple divorced, the parties litigated the fate of 
the remaining two pre-embryos. McQueen wanted to use the remaining pre-
embryos to mother more children, while Gadberry did not want to have more 
children with McQueen, due to the difficulties they had co-parenting their 
twins.80 The court held that no transfer, release, or use of the frozen embryos 
could occur without the signed authorization of both parties; in other words, 
it insisted on mutual continued consent to use the embryos for any future 
parenthood endeavors.81 
In sum, when courts have relied on a contractual model to resolve 
disputes over embryos, they have been reluctant to give priority to parties 
who want to proceed with the IVF process—no matter the content of the 
contract signed. When contracts have stated that the procedure would be 
stopped if one of the parties so desired, courts have enforced them. When 
contracts have stated otherwise, courts have generally considered them 
unenforceable.82 
V. THE RELIANCE MODEL AND BALANCING THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 
Although the traditional contractual model is the most common 
approach to IVF cases in the U.S., some jurisdictions have embraced an 
alternative variation to emphasize the importance of reliance. These cases 
usually result in dramatically different outcomes than those applying the 
traditional contractual model. Here, courts more often find it possible to 
enforce IVF-related contracts, leading to a prioritization of a positive right to 
parenthood in some circumstances. In doing so, courts have tended to focus 
 
 76.  McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 132–33 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g and transfer 
denied (Dec. 15, 2016), transfer denied 2017 Mo. LEXIST 32 (Mo. Jan. 31, 2017). 
 77.  Id. at 133.  
 78.  Id. at 133–34. 
 79.  Id. at 133. 
 80.  Id. at 135–36. 
 81.  Id. at 158.  
 82.  For criticism of a sweeping resistance for the enforcement of such contracts, see generally 
Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Public Policing of Intimate Agreements, 25 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 159 
(2013). 
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on each case’s unique context, considering the parties’—and their 
agreements’—specific characteristics. 
The first example of this approach comes from Israel and lies at the 
heart of the so-called Nahmani affair.83 Considering Israel’s cultural and 
political embrace of parenthood and fertility medicine,84 it may come as no 
surprise that an alternative, positive rights-based view emerged for the first 
time there. The essential facts in Nahmani are similar to many of the previous 
cases discussed above. They involved a married couple, Ruti and Danny 
Nahmani, who commenced IVF with plans to complete the process using 
surrogacy because Ruti had undergone a hysterectomy.85 Accordingly, 
Danny’s sperm was used to fertilize Ruti’s remaining eggs.86 During the 
process, the couple separated.87 Ruti wanted to move forward with 
surrogacy, which was her only chance to achieve biological parenthood, but 
Danny, who by the time the case commenced had a new partner and children, 
did not.88 In other words, as is usual in these cases, only one of the parties 
wanted to proceed with the IVF process. In contrast to many of the cases 
discussed so far, however, here, no clear contractual provision applied.89 
Further, in contrast to most, if not all the previous cases, the litigation 
concerned a “to be or not to be” situation. For Ruti, the disputed embryos 
provided her only hope for biological children. 
In a relatively extraordinary manner, this case was litigated not once, 
but twice before the Israeli Supreme Court, first by a five justices panel,90 
and then by an enlarged panel of eleven justices.91 In the first round of 
litigation, the Court adopted a line of reasoning very similar to that in the 
U.S. cases previously discussed. The majority of the panel (four justices) 
ruled that the right to be a parent and the right to avoid parenthood are “two 
sides of the same coin,”92 and that the right to avoid parenthood should be 
prioritized over the right to parenthood, which inherently carries burdens for 
 
 83.  See CA 5587/93 Nahmani v. Nahmani 49(1) PD 485 (1995) (Isr.) (hereinafter First Nahmani 
decision); FHA 2401/95 Nahmani v. Nahmani 50(4) PD 661 (1996) (Isr.) (hereinafter Second Nahmani 
decision). Interestingly, the decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court in this renowned case were referenced 
in some of the decisions of other jurisdictions mentioned earlier. See Daphne Barak-Erez, Judicial 
Conversations and Comparative Law: The Case of Non-Hegemonic Countries, 47 TULSA L. REV. 405, 
418–20 (2011). 
 84.  See supra Part I (discussing the historical and cultural reasons for Israel’s support of IVF).   
 85.  First Nahmani decision, supra note 83, at 495. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id.  
 91.  Second Nahmani decision, supra note 83, at 2. 
 92.  First Nahmani decision, supra note 83, at 500. 
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the other side.93 In addition, the majority stated that the contract between the 
parties, to the extent that it obligated Danny, was unenforceable.94 This 
decision, like its foreign predecessors, exclusively applied the contractual 
model95 and did not meaningful give weight to Ruti’s irreversible reliance. 
In contrast, in the second hearing of the case96 (initiated via the Court’s 
special capacity to rehear a case due to its precedential value),97 the majority 
(seven justices) prioritized Ruti’s right to parenthood, while four justices 
dissented. The rationale of the various justices in the majority differed, but 
in general, they all pointed to the fact that the case was one of first 
impression, and therefore the Court’s decision could be inspired by reference 
to equity and justice.98 In this context, the case’s special circumstances—the 
fact that it represented one of the parties’ only chance for biological 
parenthood—played a major role. The Court was confronted by two 
legitimate, but conflicting, considerations.99 On the one hand, Danny’s 
consent to the procedure was given under the assumption that the 
circumstances (the couple’s marriage) would continue, and his change of 
view regarding the embryos was thus understandable. But on the other hand, 
it was impossible to disregard the fact that his consent triggered an 
irreversible decision on Ruti’s side—to use his sperm for the fertilization of 
her last eggs. Ultimately, the Court held that she should not have to bear the 
grave consequences of his reversal. 
For many years, the Israeli Nahmani decision was a lone precedent. 
Several commentators expressed their support of its more nuanced approach, 
but it did not leave a mark on actual court decisions.100 It took some time 
before U.S. judgments signaled a similar approach when addressing 
circumstances where, because of a party’s reliance on his or her partner’s 
consent, that party would not have another opportunity to achieve biological 
 
 93.  Id. at 500–01. 
 94.  Id. at 513–14. 
 95.  See supra Part III(A) (explaining the contractual model). 
 96.  First Nahmani decision, supra note 83, at 485. 
 97.  Basic Law: Judicature § 18 (Isr.). 
 98.  See First Nahmani decision, supra note 83, at 742–43 (Bach, J.). In contrast, some of the 
dissenting Justices insisted that their result was also supported by justice considerations. See id. at 785–
88 (Zamir, J.). 
 99. See Daphne Barak-Erez and Ron Shapira, The Delusion of Symmetric Rights, 19 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUDS. 297, 301–05 (1999). 
 100.  See, e.g., Helene S. Shapo, Frozen Pre-Embryos and the Right to Change One’s Mind, 12 DUKE 
J. COMP. & INT’L L. 75, 102–03 (2002) (arguing that courts, in making decisions regarding reproduction, 
should take into account factors such as whether the parties have children or are able to have additional 
children, as well as public policy considerations); Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, 
81 U.S.C. L. REV. 1115, 1115–16 (arguing that the right not to be a genetic, gestational, or legal parent 
are separable rights) (2008). 
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parenthood. In retrospect, this approach may be traced to the earlier 
American court decisions discussed above,101 but they never expressly 
articulated it because those cases concerned contexts where the party who 
wished to continue with the process had not faced a “last chance” scenario. 
For example, while the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Davis v. Davis102 
applied a balancing approach (after it found that the parties did not have an 
agreement that covered the wife’s wish to donate the frozen embryos),103 
there, the wife did not want to use the embryos herself—whereas the husband 
made a powerful argument regarding the agony he would experience at being 
separated from the children who would result.104 
Courts in the United States eventually had the opportunity to reach the 
same conclusion as the Israeli Court did in the Nahmani affair—giving 
priority to the party who wanted to continue the IVF process when it was his 
or her last chance to achieve biological parenthood—and did so in Reber v. 
Reiss105 and Szafranski v. Dunston.106 Both involved women diagnosed with 
cancer who underwent IVF specifically to preserve their fertility. In each 
case, embryos were formed and cryopreserved. When the women’s 
respective partners wished to halt the process, the court denied their requests 
and awarded both women sole rights over the embryos.107 
Reber v. Reiss was decided first, by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. 
The court held that unless the legislature legislated otherwise, it was the 
court’s duty to consider the individual circumstances of each case.108 The 
court explained that in the case before it, because the husband and wife had 
never made an agreement concerning a scenario of divorce prior to 
undergoing IVF, and since the pre-embryos were likely the wife’s only 
opportunity to achieve biological parenthood (and her best chance to achieve 
parenthood at all), the balancing of interests tipped in favor of the wife.109 
The court stated that adoption, while a “laudable, wonderful, and fulfilling 
 
 101.  See supra Part IV (detailing the Davis v. Davis line of cases).  
 102.  842 S.W.2d 588, 603 (Tenn. 1992).  
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. at 603–04. Even though in this instance, the party choosing not to continue IVF prevailed, 
it is implicit to the balancing test that this outcome may not always result). A hint in this direction can 
also be found in JB v. MB, where the court noted that priority “ordinarily” goes to the negative right—
i.e., there are certain cases where the balance would favor the party who wanted to continue IVF 
treatment. See supra note 60. 
 105.  Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1142 (Pa. Super. 2012). 
 106.  Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1164 (Ill App. Ct. 2015). 
 107.  Reber, 42 A.3d at 1142. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id.  
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experience . . . occupies a different place for a woman than the opportunity 
to be pregnant and/or have a biological child.”110 
The Appellate Court of Illinois held similarly in Szafranski v. Dunston. 
In that case, the appellee, Karla Dunston, was diagnosed with lymphoma.111 
Since her course of treatment presented the risk of infertility, she and her 
partner, Jacob Szafranski, used IVF to freeze embryos.112 Several months 
later, their relationship ended.113 The cancer treatment rendered Dunston 
infertile; the three embryos she had frozen with Szafranski thus represented 
her only chance to have biological children.114 Prior to any attempts by 
Dunston to implant the embryos, Szafranski sued to prevent her from using 
them.115 At trial, the court held that a prior verbal agreement between the 
parties supported Dunston’s position.116 The trial court expressly rejected 
Szafranski’s argument that the informed consent document supplied by the 
fertility clinic (which stated that the embryos could not be used unless both 
parties agreed) modified or superseded their oral contract.117 The Illinois 
Court of Appeals affirmed,118 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.119 
Though formally speaking, the case was decided by using the contractual 
model, in practice, it applied the reliance model. 
Obviously, these two cases are uniquely different from previous U.S. 
cases, which involved a party who wanted to implant embryos without the 
other’s consent when that party already had children. This difference is 
reflected in their results, which were largely influenced by the grave reliance 
involved. 
Notably, in the Irish case Roche v. Roche,120 where one party (the wife) 
wanted to implant IVF-produced embryos while her estranged husband did 
not, the Court considered relevant the fact that the couple already had two 
children, one naturally and one through IVF.121 Indeed, the Court held that 
 
 110.  Id. at 1139. It is worthwhile adding that the husband’s financial concerns were dismissed on 
the ground of the wife’s commitment not to seek financial support from him if a child was born. I would 
add that the validity of such a commitment should be considered at best questionable. At any rate the 
financial concerns are usually not at the center of the conflicts in this area, partly because they become 
prevalent only at a later stage.  
 111.  Szafranski 34 N.E.3d at 1136. 
 112.  Id.  
 113.  Id. at 1140. 
 114.  Id. at 1163. 
 115.  Id. at 1136. 
 116.  Id. at 1149. 
 117.  Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1153 (Ill App. Ct. 2015). 
 118.  Id. at 1164. 
 119.  Szafranski v. Dunston, 136 S. Ct. 1230, 1230 (2016).  
 120.  Roche v. Roche, (2009) 2 I.R. 321, 321 (S.C.) (Ir.). 
 121.  Id. at para. 37 (Denham, J.). 
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the parties had not agreed to move forward with the procedure in the case of 
separation.122 However, the Court then went on to consider the parties’ 
circumstances. Specifically, it noted that the wife had already secured her 
right to biological parenthood.123 As Judge Denham said, “All the 
circumstances would have to be considered carefully. If a party had no 
children, and had no other opportunity of having a child, that would be a 
relevant factor for consideration.”124 Based on the facts of the case, the five 
justices who sat on the wife’s appeal unanimously dismissed it.125 
The U.S. case In re Marriage of Rooks reflected a similar sentiment.126 
Mary and Drake Rooks married in 2002, and Drake filed for divorce in 
2014.127 During their marriage, the Rooks had three children, all conceived 
using IVF.128 In addition, the couple had six embryos in cryostorage.129 It 
was undisputed that Mary used her last eggs to create the embryos.130 The 
couple had signed an agreement with the fertility clinic stating, among other 
things, that in the event of divorce and if the couple could not agree, the trial 
court would decide who would have custody over the embryos.131 
Nevertheless, the Colorado Appellate Court expressly rejected the 
contractual approach as unrealistic.132 It stated that since the contract was 
ambiguous, it was necessary to employ a balancing approach to the dispute 
instead.133 More specifically, the court found that since the husband’s interest 
in not having children outweighed the wife’s desire to have a fourth child, 
the balance tilted toward the husband.134 In the circumstances, the wife’s 
reliance on the IVF process for the purpose of having another child was 
outweighed by her husband’s right not to be a parent to another child.135 
VI. THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATION 
Due to the complicated, value-laden aspect of this area of law, a clear 
legislative scheme could be of great assistance. Of course, legislation is not 
 
 122.  Id. at para. 34 (Denham, J.). 
 123.  Id.  
 124.  Id. 
 125.  See Roche v. Roche, (2009) 2 I.R. 321, 353, 366, 373, 383, 395 (S.C.) (Ir.). 
 126.  In re Marriage of Rooks, No. 15CA0990, 2016 WL 6123561 (Colo. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2016).  
 127.  Id. ¶ 7. 
 128.  Id. ¶ 8. 
 129.  Id.  
 130.  Id. ¶ 2. 
 131.  Id. ¶ 3. 
 132.  Id. ¶ 36  
 133.  Id. ¶¶ 37–38. 
 134.  Id. ¶¶ 42–46. 
 135.  Id.  
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a panacea, and the question regarding the preferred content of that legislation 
remains. Nevertheless, it is a pity that instructive legislation in this area is 
often lacking. The U.S. cases were decided in the absence of legislation, as 
were the cases in Israel and in Ireland. An example of a system that has had 
such legislation in place from a relatively early stage is the UK, where the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990136 sets out clear rules 
regarding the fate of frozen embryos. Schedule 3 of the law states that either 
partner may withdraw his or her consent, in writing, at any time before the 
implantation of the fertilized eggs in question and thus prevent the other 
party from going forward with the procedure.137 Similar legislation was 
subsequently enacted in Canada.138 Against this background, it is helpful to 
analyze the leading IVF case emanating from the UK, Evans v. United 
Kingdom,139 which was eventually heard by the Grand Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights. 
The basic facts in Evans are similar to those that characterized the 
Nahmani affair:140 the case represented one of the parties’ only opportunity 
to achieve biological parenthood. Natalie Evans started IVF treatments with 
her then-partner, Howard Johnston.141 After the couple split, Johnston wrote 
to the clinic storing the embryos to request that they be destroyed.142 Evans 
opposed Johnston’s request and immediately began legal proceedings.143 As 
in Nahmani, the couple had started the treatment after Evans was diagnosed 
with ovarian cancer, and therefore the embryos in question were likely her 
only chance to achieve biological parenthood.144 In contrast to the situation 
in Nahmani, however, the case was purportedly ruled by a clear statutory 
provision rather than a contractual understanding—and the statute supported 
Johnston.145 
Evans was unsuccessful at all stages of litigation, though various courts 
expressed sympathy toward her.146 In the first instance, her case was 
 
 136.  Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, c.37 (Eng.). 
 137.  Id. at sched. 3. 
 138.  See Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2, Sec. 8 (2004); see also Assisted Human 
Reproduction (Section 8 Consent) Regulations, SOR/2007-137 (2007).  
 139.  Evans v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6339/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Apr. 10, 2007). 
 140.  See, supra, Part IV. 
 141.  Evans, App. No. 6339/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 13 (Apr. 10, 2007). 
 142.  Id. at para. 18. 
 143.  Id. at para. 19. 
 144.  Id. at para. 14. 
 145.  Id. at para. 57. 
 146.  See, e.g., id. at para. 90 (“As regards the balance struck between the conflicting Article 8 rights 
of the parties to the IVF treatment, the Grand Chamber, in common with every other court which has 
examined this case, has great sympathy for the applicant, who clearly desires a genetically related child 
above all else.”); Evans v. Amicus Healthcare Ltd. & Ors, EWCA Civ 727 at para. 69 (2004) (“The 
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dismissed by the High Court.147 Her appeal was then dismissed by the Court 
of Appeals, which affirmed the decision.148 Evans’ application for leave to 
appeal to the House of Lords was dismissed, and she eventually took her case 
to the European Court of Human Rights.149 In 2006, the European Court of 
Human Rights, in a panel of seven judges, delivered a 5-2 majority ruling 
against Evans.150 The European Court also expressed sympathy for Evans, 
but ultimately concluded that her right to family life could not override her 
partner’s withdrawal of consent.151 Evans then applied to the Grand Chamber 
of the European Court. In 2007, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR Ruled 
against Evans’ appeal (13 judges against 4).152 
The fate of the proceedings in Evans demonstrates that legislation, qua 
legislation, does not necessarily provide satisfactory solutions to all parties. 
In practice, specific legislation may elicit the same questions that are debated 
in cases decided without its guidance. Indeed, some countries that have 
legislated on the matter have chosen the threshold juncture—after which 
consent cannot be withdrawn—as the fertilization of eggs, not their 
implantation.153 This is Italy’s approach, under its comprehensive 2004 law 
on this matter.154 Originally, the Italian law was intended to preclude related 
conflicts by outlawing freezing embryos and limiting the permitted number 
of fertilized eggs in each round of treatment to three.155 However, this 
provision of the law was declared unconstitutional by the Italian 
Constitutional Court.156 In contrast, the American Bar Association’s 
 
sympathy and concern which anyone must feel for Ms. Evans is not enough to render the legislative 
scheme of Sch. 3 disproportionate.”). 
 147.  Evans v. Amicus Healthcare Ltd. & Ors, EWHC 2161 (Fam) 1, 70 (2003). 
 148.  Evans v. Amicus Healthcare Ltd. & Ors, EWCA Civ 727 at para. 121 (2004). 
 149.  See Evans v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6339/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 13 (Apr. 10, 2007). 
 150.  Id. at para. 6. 
 151.  See id. at para. 67 (“The Court, like the national courts, has great sympathy for the plight of the 
applicant who, if implantation does not take place, will be deprived of the ability to give birth to her own 
child. However, like the national courts, the Court does not find that the absence of a power to override a 
genetic parent’s withdrawal of consent, even in the exceptional circumstances of the present case, is such 
as to upset the fair balance required by Article 8.”). 
 152.  See id. at para. 93–96 (Apr. 10, 2007). 
 153.  See Rosy Thornton, European Court of Human Rights: Consent to IVF treatment, 6 INT. J. 
CONST. L. 317, 330 (2008) (pointing to legislation in Austria and Estonia that chose differently). For 
criticism of the Canadian legislation, which insists on the continuing consent, just as in the UK, see 
Stefanie Carsley, Rethinking Canadian Legal Responses to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 29 CAN. J. FAM. L. 
55, 61 (2014). 
 154.  Legge 19 febbraio 2004, n.40, G.U. Feb. 24, 2004, n.45, art. 6(3) (It.). 
 155.  Id. art. 14(2). 
 156.  Corte Cost., 8 maggio 2009, n. 151, Foro it. 2009, I, ¶ 2. At any rate, the Italian law did not 
affect already existing frozen embryos. In Parrillo v. Italy, No. 46470/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 47 (2015), the 
European Court of Human Rights dismissed an attack on the law coming from a woman who wanted to 
donate the frozen embryos she had produced with her late husband for research. 
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proposed Model Act would not permit parties to implant embryos for 
reproduction after one of the intended parents asserted his or her desire not 
to procreate.157 
Although legislation does not necessarily solve the dilemmas discussed 
here, having legislation in place has merits. Legislation may shape the 
expectations of the parties starting the IVF process. In addition, legislation 
can dictate what an enforceable contract concerning a joint IVF endeavor 
may and should include,158 including the maximum time limit for keeping 
fertilized eggs, as well as provide procedures for bringing suit in related 
disputes.159 
VII. BEYOND RELIANCE? 
This essay would not be complete without an analysis of more recent 
cases in which the question of promoting an IVF procedure was raised when 
reliance (in terms of the impact on one party’s sole opportunity to achieve 
biological parenthood) was not involved. By way of contrast, these cases 
shed light on the importance of reliance—and courts’ strong reservations 
regarding moving forward with fertilization processes without it. 
The first example worth discussing is the Sperm Bank case,160 decided 
by the Supreme Court of Israel. The case dealt with the petition of a woman 
who sought to proceed with an IVF procedure using the sperm of an 
anonymous donor, whose sperm she had already used to give birth to a 
daughter.161 In the time that had passed since her first pregnancy, the donor 
 
 157.  See P. Kindregan Jr. & Steven H. Snyder, Clarifying the Law of ART: The New American Bar 
Association Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 42 FAM. L. Q. 203, 212–13 (2008). 
This approach reflects the view of some state laws. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.706 (2009). 
 158.  See Shirley Darby Howell, The Frozen Embryo: Scholarly Theories, Case Law, and Proposed 
State Regulation, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 407, 436 (2013) (supporting a pre-commitment 
contractual approach subject to legislation that will clarify the rules regarding the contract). 
 159.  See, e.g., The Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (Austl.), which served the basis for 
the litigation in G. v. G. (2007) FCWA 80. Section 24(1) of this law states that “no human egg undergoing 
fertilization or human embryo shall be stored for a period in excess of 10 years except with the approval 
of the Council under subsection (1a).” Section 26(2) states that “where rights in relation to a human egg 
undergoing fertilization or a human embryo are vested in a couple and the couple disagree about its use 
or continued storage, the CEO shall, on application by a member of that couple, direct the licensee storing 
the egg or embryo to ensure that the storage is maintained subject to –. . . (c) any order made by a court 
of competent jurisdiction which otherwise requires.” In this case, the Family Court of Western Australia 
examined the status of a couple’s fertilized eggs following the breakdown of their relationship. After 
separating, one party wanted to discard the fertilized eggs, but the other sought to have them transferred 
into his custody, most likely for donation to an infertile couple. In the circumstances of the case, the court 
held that the parties’ intent at the time of the procedure did not include donation (in addition to its 
unfavorable impression from the party seeking to donate the eggs). 
 160.  See Sperm Bank case, supra note 1. 
 161.  Id. at para. 1. 
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had approached the sperm bank and asked that it no longer use his sperm, as 
he had had a change of heart regarding having biological children in the 
world with whom he had no connection.162 From a formal perspective, the 
parties to the litigation were the woman and the sperm bank, but in fact, the 
sperm bank was protecting the wishes of the donor. In essence, then, this was 
another example of a horizontal clash. 
The Court prioritized the donor’s rights not to be a parent over the 
woman’s request to become a parent using his sperm. In so doing, the court 
balanced the parties’ clashing rights in a way that gave more weight to the 
party seeking the negative right to avoid parenthood than it did in the 
Nahmani affair—but for good reasons. First, there was no issue of reliance, 
in the full sense of the word. The petitioner had not secured the sperm prior 
to her first pregnancy, and thus could not rationally expect a right to it 
later.163 Second, and more importantly, the donor’s refusal did not lead to a 
wholesale denial of the petitioner’s chance to achieve biological parenthood. 
The issue was rather whether the petitioner had the right to become a mother 
to a child with specific genetic traits.164 The Court deemed her desire 
insufficiently important to overcome the right of the other party to avoid 
parenthood.165 
A second useful example is the Potential Grandparents case,166 another 
relatively recent judgment by the Supreme Court of Israel. It concerned the 
bereaved parents of a young man who wished to use their deceased son’s 
 
 162.  Id. at para. 20 (Rubinstein, J.). 
 163.  Id. at para. 9 (Rubinstein, J.). 
 164.  A new bill aimed at regulating the operation of sperm banks in Israel at large seems to adopt 
the view of the Court, by stating that sperm donors will be allowed to abolish their consent to donate if 
they decide to do so before the sperm has been used for fertilization. See Sperm Banks Bill, § 24 (2017) 
(Isr.). 
 165.  In this case, the Court also dismissed a simple property model, which was endorsed in Canada. 
See J.C.M. v. A.N.A., 2012 BCSC 584, ¶ 55 (Can.) (holding that sperm straws should be considered 
property). JCM and ANA, two women, were married in 1998. Id. ¶ 3. ANA gave birth to a child in 2000 
and JCM gave birth to a child in 2002, both through therapeutic insemination with sperm from a single 
donor. Id. After the procedures, thirteen sperm straws were left over. Id. ¶ 6. In 2007, the couple entered 
a separation agreement Id. ¶ 4. In 2011, JCM, wanting more children with a new partner, asked ANA if 
she could use the remaining sperm straws, but ANA preferred the sperm straws be destroyed.  Id. ¶ 13. 
The court, after analyzing multiple cases and secondary sources from Canada, America, and Britain, 
concluded that the sperm straws in this case should be treated as property. Id. ¶ 55. To so conclude, the 
court relied mainly on the Canadian case of C.C. v. A.W., supra note 14, and the UK case Jonathan 
Yearworth & Ors v. North Bristol NHS Trust, (2009) EWCA Civ 37 (involving six men who gave 
samples of their sperm before undergoing chemotherapy, whose sperm was then negligently destroyed). 
Id. ¶ 55. While the Court stated that sperm straws should be considered property, it did note that that 
frozen embryos, with their greater “potential for human life,” were more likely to be in an “interim 
category” between person and property. Id. ¶ 66. Ultimately, it held that the thirteen sperm straws would 
be divided and half would be given to each party. Id. ¶ 55. 
 166.  RFA 7141/15 Anonymous v. Anonymous (2016) (Isr.) (Potential Grandparents case). 
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sperm to have a grandchild,167 in a manner that would allow for the 
realization of his unfulfilled parenthood. This type of case is considered 
particularly heartbreaking in the Israeli context, when such requests are 
sometimes (though not necessarily) submitted by parents who have lost their 
children during military service. Such requests are sometimes debated only 
in the vertical sphere, between private parties and the state, but occasionally 
they also surface in the horizontal one—particularly when the bereaved 
parents’ aspirations do not conform to those of the decedent’s partner. In 
theory, it is also possible to imagine the same case from the opposite 
perspective—a surviving partner who wishes to continue with the 
fertilization process against the wishes of the decedent’s bereaved parents 
(although in terms of actual life experience, this would not be a typical 
case).168 
In fact, the vertical controversy is not easy either, as it presents new 
questions regarding the wish of the decedent himself, as well as the 
implications for a child who is born with the knowledge that he or she was 
“planned” after the death of a genetic parent. Several years ago, Israel’s 
Attorney General promulgated instructions guiding hospitals to permit 
harvesting sperm from deceased men at the request of their partners, under 
the assumption that they would be best situated to express the will of the 
deceased. 
In the Potential Grandparents case, however, the surviving partner did 
not want to become pregnant and also resisted the use of her deceased 
spouse’s sperm by his parents. The Supreme Court decided (in a majority of 
four, against the dissenting view of Justice Melcer), that the bereaved parents 
should not be permitted to move forward, as doing so would go beyond the 
knowable will of their son.169 The characteristics of this case are somewhat 
different from the cases above, but it reflects the proposition, once again, that 
judicial decisions supporting the right to parenthood are often limited to 
circumstances in which there is irreversible reliance on an IVF process that 
has already commenced. 
 
 167.  Id. at para. 1 (Hayut, J.). 
 168.  In re Estate of Kievernagel, 166 Cal. App. 4th 1024, 1026–27 (Cal Ct. App. 2008) presents an 
opposite case of this type. In this case a husband had given his sperm but had signed an agreement stating 
that he wanted it destroyed in the event of his death. After he passed away, his parents sought to have his 
apparent intent respected by destroying his frozen sperm, but his widow, who was also the administrator 
of his estate, wanted to use the sperm to have children. The court held that the intent of the deceased 
should be honored. In this case, the decision was easier in at least two ways—firstly, the sperm had 
already been given prior to the death of the husband; secondly, and more importantly, the late husband 
had clearly expressed his will on this matter.  
 169.  Potential Grandparents case, supra note 166, at para. 34 (Hayut, J.). 
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CONCLUSION 
Cases involving reproductive technologies will most certainly continue 
to appear in courts. Judges deciding these cases will need to continue 
addressing legal questions that are entangled with moral- and value-laden 
considerations. Over time, courts’ accumulated experiences from cases such 
as those discussed above have, at least partially, opened the door for more 
nuanced analyses, beyond a simplistic contractual approach. This essay has 
presented the models that courts have used, with varying degrees of success, 
to resolve controversies between former partners regarding IVF procedures. 
At the same time, it has revealed that employing purely formal legal 
categories does not by itself resolve the value-laden dilemmas in this area of 
law, and that, in fact, courts are generally influenced by more substantive 
considerations, such as a party’s reliance and its impact on reaching a just 
solution. Further, because developments in the law have often resulted from 
disputes that legislation did not anticipate, legislatures have been in fact far 
less influential in the development of law in this area. Accordingly, courts 
decide cases of this sort also by reference to their particular circumstances, 
as well as, sometimes, their broader cultural context. 
 
